We examine the impact of continuous disclosure regulatory reform on the likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts issued in New Zealand's low private litigation environment. Using a sample of 720 earnings forecasts issued by 94 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange before and after the reform (1999 to 2005), we provide strong evidence of significant changes in forecasting behaviour in the post-reform period. Specifically, firms were more likely to issue earnings forecasts to pre-empt earnings announcements and, in contrast to findings in other legal settings, those earnings forecasts exhibited higher frequency and improved qualitative characteristics (better precision and accuracy). An important implication of our findings is that public regulatory reforms may have a greater benefit in a low private litigation environment and thus add to the global debate about the effectiveness of alternative public regulatory reforms of corporate requirements.
Introduction
In the wake of the global financial crisis the calls for greater public enforcement of corporate behaviour despite the lack of empirical evidence of the effectiveness of such regulatory intervention have amplified (Sacasa, 2008) . However, recent regulatory reforms in the United States (the U.S.), such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, have been criticised on the basis of imposing significantly high costs on firms, especially when private enforcement through shareholder litigation may in some cases provide more efficient solutions than regulatory reform (Pasha, 2006) . There has also been criticism of the effectiveness of private enforcement in the U.S. by researchers who suggest that high litigation costs associated with private enforcement have a negative impact on corporate behaviour (Rogers and Buskirk, 2009 ).
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A major impediment to investigating the relative merits of public enforcement versus private enforcement is the difficulty associated with isolating the separate impact of incremental public enforcement reform and private litigation. This is especially the case in the U.S. where the threat of both public and private enforcement is high. It may be possible that the net benefits from public enforcement are more easily identifiable where there is little private enforcement.
Similar to the other low private litigation environments, such as Australia and Canada, the effectiveness of private litigation taken by shareholders and others in New Zealand is impaired by the combination of high costs, a onerous burden of individual reliance proof and damages determined by judges rather than juries resulting in low damage awards (Macfarlane, 2008) . This low private litigation environment is further exaggerated in New Zealand where contingent fees and alternative funding are prohibited. This results in the need for up-front 1 Rogers and Buskirk (2009) find that high private litigation costs in the U.S. discourage good faith disclosures which they argue to be inconsistent with the belief that private enforcement enhances corporate transparency.
payments for litigation and an anti-litigious culture unique to New Zealand.
2 Therefore, the New Zealand context provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of incremental regulatory reform in a very low litigation environment with the absence of any viable private enforcement.
The Securities Markets Act 1988 was amended in 2002 as part of a broad reform of securities regulation in New Zealand to include statutory sanctions to support the New Zealand Exchange (NZX)'s continuous disclosure listing rules. The suggestion that New Zealand should follow the U.S. by instituting quarterly reporting was rejected. It was decided that it would be better for New Zealand to harmonise with Australia with the adoption of a mandatory continuous disclosure regime.
The amended Act requires NZX-listed firms to disclose any material information to investors as they arise. Failure to comply with the amended Act, and/or orders made by the Securities Commission in relation to continuous disclosure, can lead to civil penalties of up to $300,000
and criminal penalties of up to $30,000. The effectiveness of this reform has been questioned due to the lack of strong enforcement exercised by the NZX and the Securities Commission.
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Several New Zealand studies provide empirical evidence that suggests that this regulatory intervention has been effective. Studies addressing the capital market impacts of this reform document that the information component of the bid-ask spread for less liquid stocks, the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts and the stock market reaction to earnings announcements and earnings forecasts, all decreased in the post-reform period (Frijns et al., 2008; Dunstan et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2009) . Huang et al. (2009) investigate the impact of this reform on corporate behaviour and find that firms increased the number of price-sensitive disclosures released to the market and improved the timeliness of their earnings announcements. Our study extends these studies by investigating the impact of this reform on the likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts. 4 The focus on management earnings forecasts provides the opportunity to examine one aspect of corporate disclosure which has been shown to be significant through the reduction of information asymmetry (Coller and Yohn, 1997) and cost of capital (Botosan, 1997) and the facilitation of "clarity and understanding" by investors (Graham et al., 2005) . In the area of corporate disclosure research, researchers have been attracted to the study of management earnings forecasts because they have a number of desirable properties that make them a superior disclosure proxy (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) . First, unlike one-off price sensitive events such as merger proposals, management earnings forecasts are generally applicable to all firms and can be readily evaluated ex post through periodic financial reports. Second, firms have discretion regarding the decision to provide earnings forecasts, the number and qualitative characteristics of earnings forecasts made which provide rich insights into the disclosure behaviour. In this study, management earnings forecasts are a good indicator to measure the impact of this reform because the NZX specifically requires the disclosure of a material change in a listed firm's financial forecast or expectation under its continuous disclosure rules. 5 We examine the changes in the likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics (horizon, precision and accuracy) of management earnings forecasts, before and after the reform, using 4 We define management earnings forecasts as all managerial disclosures predicting earnings prior to the release of corresponding earnings announcements. 5 Under the NZX Listing Rule 10 Disclosure and Information, management earnings forecasts and any expected changes thereto are the first mentioned as important and relevant. While the NZX has recognised that there are situations where firms should legally be allowed to withhold material information by including the carve-out provisions, a firm is still required to release specific information when an earnings change is probable and/or it is necessary to prevent the development of a false market in a firm's securities. Firms tended to delay the release of their earnings forecasts that might lead to the improvement in forecast precision and accuracy. Both forecast precision and accuracy have significantly improved after the reform became effective.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, published prior research on continuous disclosure has not studied such a comprehensive number of management earnings forecast characteristics before and after the introduction of statutory sanctions for continuous disclosure rules in a low private litigation environment. Second, our findings add to the evidence that the enhancement of public enforcement in New Zealand has had a positive impact on capital market characteristics and corporate behaviour. Third, our evidence contradicts the findings of the extant literature by failing to indentify an asymmetric treatment of good and bad earnings news.
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises relevant disclosure and management earnings forecast literature and describes the research hypotheses. An 6 Firms may release earnings forecasts via routine events such as mandatory periodic financial reports, chairman's addresses at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) and letters to shareholders. Firm may alternatively release earnings forecasts via non-routine events at anytime throughout the year (Chan et al., 2007) . The timely release of non-routine earnings forecasts ensures a fully informed market; therefore, the change in the likelihood and frequency of non-routine management earnings forecasts provides further evidence for the impact of this continuous disclosure reform on management earnings forecast behaviour.
overview of the research design is provided in section 3. Section 4 presents the results and the study concludes in section 5.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The disclosure literature 7 suggests that managers' decisions to disclose information, including earnings forecasts 8 , can involve significant benefits (i.e. less information asymmetry, lower cost of capital and better "clarity and understanding" by investors) as well as costs (i.e.
proprietary, litigation and reputation costs). Therefore, managers will balance these benefits and costs in deciding the optimal level of disclosure for their firms. The intervention of a public regulatory reform will act as an external shock to this disclosure equilibrium. The impact of this type of shock will vary depending on the type of regulatory reform involved and other environmental factors including the current effectiveness of existing private enforcement.
The strong culture of private litigation prevailing in the U.S. means that the effectiveness of a public regulatory reform on corporate disclosure behaviour may be either diminished or augmented by the threat of strong private enforcement. Two important U.S. public reforms which have been investigated by researchers are the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1995 (PSLRA) and the Regulation Fair Disclosure 2000 (Reg FD). 9 Johnson et al. (2001) examine the impact of the PSLRA on management earnings forecasts. These authors were concerned that there may be a negative impact from the extended safe harbour provided which could protect firms from litigation due to providing inaccurate earnings forecasts.
However, they failed to find empirical evidence that there had been negative impact on the 7 See Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) for reviews of the disclosure literature. 8 See Cameron (1986) , King et al. (1990) and Hirst et al. (2008) for reviews of the management earnings forecast literature. 9 The PSLRA introduces a statutory "safe harbour" for forward-looking statements provided in good faith and the Reg FD effectively bans firms from selectively disclosing information.
quantity and quality of management earnings forecasts. Other authors examining the Reg FD also had concerns that there might be an unintended negative impact on corporate disclosure behaviour. Specifically, there might be an information-chilling effect where firms might become reluctant to publicly disclose information for fear of litigation as these public disclosures might be later used against them. Again, their empirical findings do not support this information-chilling expectation as they find no discernable negative impact of the reform on the level of voluntary disclosure (Bailey et al., 2003; Heflin et al., 2003) . An exception from these findings is provided by Wang (2007) who finds that firms with lower information asymmetry and higher proprietary information costs did reduce their level of voluntary disclosure in response to the imposition of the Reg FD. These empirical findings suggest that in the U.S. the extent of a firm's exposure to private litigation risk is an important determinant of corporate disclosure strategies even where there has been a significant regulatory reform.
In Australia, where private litigation risk has traditionally been lower than in the U.S., it is possible that the threat of private enforcement has less impact on the corporate reaction to public reforms. Research findings are generally supportive of a positive impact on corporate disclosure behaviour as the strength of public enforcement increases over time. Brown et al. (1999) examine the capital market impact of the Australian continuous disclosure reform and find that there was an increase in the frequency of price-sensitive disclosures made by firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). However, the increase was confined to smaller firms and for those that were more likely to reveal bad news. In a later study, Chan et al. (2007) contend that the increased enforcement action by the ASIC in relation to the Australian continuous disclosure reform significantly increased the level of non-routine earnings forecasts in the period after 1 January 2000. However, their findings are mainly driven by bad news non-routine earnings forecasts. These consistent asymmetric findings between bad and good news firms in both Brown et al. (1999) and Chan et al. (2007) , which are similar to most prior U.S. disclosure research (e.g. Skinner, 1994) , are interesting given the fact that Australia also has relatively low private litigation risk compared to that of the U.S. The effectiveness of this reform has been challenged due to little evidence of strong enforcement by either the NZX or the Securities Commission. Penalties for breaches of the 10 This empirical evidence is contrary to expectations that the asymmetric treatment of bad and good news would not prevail in the low private litigation environment of Australia. Further evidence of the anomalous asymmetric treatment of news content is observed in the studies by Gallery et al. (2002) and Gallery et al. (2010 Given this lack of enforcement, it could be argued that the Act's provisions are merely corrective, rather than punitive or preventive (McGill, 2004) . However, it cannot be assumed that earlier non-compliance is due to weak enforcement power. There may be a learning effect associated with the reform. Anecdotal evidence indicates that firms were struggling with interpreting and meeting the continuous disclosure requirements (Gaynor, 2003) . With respect to management earnings forecasts, Gaynor (2003) suggests three factors, which effectively deter firms from forecasting earnings on a timely basis. First, firms are reluctant to provide downward earnings forecast revisions until the last moment due to either the hope of a turnaround to be achieved or to avoid unnecessary negative reaction by investors. Second, firms have difficulty in distinguishing between an aberration and a trend in sales and earnings.
Third, firms may find it difficult to provide earnings forecasts outside their normal half-yearly budget cycle.
Due to the strength of views regarding the likely impact of the reform, we state our hypotheses regarding the forecast likelihood and frequency in the null form.
H1: There is no change in the likelihood that firms issue management earnings
forecasts (overall and non-routine) in the post-reform period.
H2: There is no change in the frequency of management earnings forecasts (overall and non-routine) issued by firms in the post-reform period.
Following the decision to release the earnings forecasts to the market, firms must then decide on the qualitative characteristics of the earnings forecasts they are reporting (King et al., 1990) . Three key qualitative characteristics of earnings forecasts are forecast horizon, forecast precision and forecast accuracy (Hirst et al., 2008) .
14 Prior research on management earnings forecasts documents significant variation in forecast characteristics across different jurisdictions which might be explained by differences in private litigation risk. Specifically, there is consistent evidence that firms from lower private litigation risk countries are more likely to provide more timely and more precise earnings forecasts (Baginski et al., 2002; Frost, 2004) . Interestingly, while prior research consistently shows that forecast precision is lower in countries with higher private litigation risks, Chan et al. (2007) find forecast precision has increased after an increase in enforcement threats in Australia. In addition, Japanese firms consistently issued over-optimistic earnings forecasts as they face no obvious legal sanctions (Kato et al., 2009) .
Consistent with the regulatory intention of creating a more informed market, we would expect that if the reform has been effective, firms will improve the quality of their disclosure.
However, critics of the reform and its apparent lack of enforcement do not expect to see changes in the qualitative characteristics of firms' earnings forecasts. Also, prior research documents the trade-off between forecast horizon and forecast precision and accuracy (Hirst et al., 2008) . Therefore, it is difficult to predict the impact of the reform on forecast horizon and its subsequent impact on forecast precision and accuracy.
Given the ambiguity about how the reform has impacted on the qualitative characteristics of earnings forecasts: horizon, precision and accuracy. We again state our hypotheses in the null form.
H3: There is no change in the horizon of management earnings forecasts issued
by firms in the post-reform period.
H4: There is no change in the precision of management earnings forecasts issued
H5: There is no change in the accuracy of management earnings forecasts issued
Research Design

Study Period and Sample
The selected study period is an eight-year period encompassing all announcements made by 
Data Sources and Classification of Management Earnings Forecasts
The Earnings forecasts are classified as good (bad) news if the content reveals favourable (unfavourable) earnings prospects relative to the previous earnings announcement or the most recent earnings forecast if one has been provided since the previous earnings announcement. 15 All 24,243 announcements are carefully read to identify announcements containing earnings forecasts. These 720 earnings forecasts include both forecasts of half-yearly and annual earnings.
Earnings forecasts are coded as neutral if the forecast indicates no expected change in earnings.
Forecast horizon captures the timeliness of the earnings forecasts. Assuming that the earnings forecasts are accurate, a longer forecast horizon provides investors with information on a timelier basis. We follow Baginski et al. (2002) by defining forecast horizon as the number of calendar days until financial year-end, regardless of whether the earnings forecast is related to half-yearly or annual period.
Forecast precision is defined as the level of specificity in the earnings forecasts. We follow Ajinkya et al. (2005) by using an ordinal coding scheme where precision is coded as 0, 1, 2 and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range and point estimates, respectively. Qualitative forecasts are those where firms provide a general impression (non-numeric) expectation about performance (e.g. we expect improved earnings performance this year). Open-ended forecasts are forecasts where firms specify a lower or an upper bound for the expected firm performance (e.g. profit will be greater than $5 million or profit will be lower than $2 million). Range forecasts contain a numerical range of expected firm performance (e.g. profit will be between $1.1 and $1.3 million). Point forecasts are the most specific, indicating a single numerical figure about expected performance (e.g. profit will be $1.2 million).
Forecast error is employed to measure the accuracy level of range and point earnings forecasts. Consistent with Ajinkya et al. (2005) , we define forecast error as the absolute value of the difference between forecasted and actual earnings deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year.
Hypothesis Testing Procedures
The hypotheses are tested using univariate methods, and due to the expected interactions across constructs, multivariate methods are employed to jointly test the hypotheses and to control for firm-specific and forecast-specific characteristics expected to impact on forecast likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics of earnings forecasts. In the multivariate procedures, we estimate random effects logistic/Poisson/linear 16 , multinomial and ordered logit regression models to make inferences about the hypothesised relationships and to control for firm-specific attributes, heterogeneity bias and non-independence across observations. The model specifications are as follows. 
where: FCAST1 = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year's earnings announcement is pre-empted by at least one earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. FCAST2 = an ordinal variable taking the value of 2, 1 and 0 if the current financial year's earnings announcement is pre-empted by, at least a non-routine earnings forecast, exclusively routine earnings forecast, or no earnings forecast, respectively. FNUM1 = the number of earnings forecasts released between the actual release dates of the mandatory earnings announcements for the prior and the current year. FNUM2 = the number of non-routine earnings forecasts released between the actual release dates of the mandatory earnings announcements for the prior and the current year.
FHORIZON =
the number of calendar days between the release date of the first earnings forecast and the corresponding financial reporting date. PRECISE1 = the level of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2 and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range and point forecasts, respectively. PRECISE2 (in model 5) takes the value of 0 and 1 for range and point earnings forecasts, respectively. ERROR = the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the forecast error measured by the difference between forecasted and actual earnings deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. Only the last range and point forecasts for the period are used.
17 REFORM = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-reform period and 0 otherwise. Significant coefficients of this variable for models 1 to 5 will provide evidence on the hypothesised relationships. ECSIGN = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. BAD = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast indicates an expected negative change in current year earnings and 0 otherwise (good and neutral forecasts). GOOD = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 of the earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in current year earnings and 0 otherwise (bad and neutral forecasts). ECHANGE = the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE = the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial year. FNUM1 is included in model 3 since the forecast horizon of the first earnings forecast is expected to be longer for firm-years where a greater number of earnings forecasts are 17 Consistent with Hirst et al. (2008) , the ERROR model only focuses on the range and point earnings forecasts. 18 Similar results are obtained when we use the market value of equity (MVE) as an alternative size proxy. 19 Forecast precision and accuracy need to be jointly examined with forecast horizon as there is a potential tradeoff between forecast horizon and forecast precision and accuracy. As more of the financial reporting period elapses and less time remains before the release of periodic reports, firms will possess more information and be more certain about the eventual outcome. (Hirst et al., 2008) and control for firm-specific factors that lead to differences in forecasting behaviour across firms independently of the existing disclosure regime. Consistent with Hossain et al. (1995) , the XLIST variable is included as a number of NZX-listed firms are cross-listed on the other foreign exchanges where more onerous disclosure rules have existed prior to the reform. 23 As cross-listed firms are not expected to have significantly changed their disclosure strategies in the post-reform period, this group of firms provide a natural control from which to compare the impact of the new rules on non-cross-listed firms. Table 2 displays the number of firm-years where earnings announcements are pre-empted by earnings forecasts and extends the analysis to the materiality of earnings changes. Overall, the number of firms years pre-empted by at least one earnings forecast has significantly increased 20 Prior research findings on management earnings forecasts are generally consistent with the litigation cost hypothesis (Skinner, 1994 (Skinner, , 1997 . According to this hypothesis, management earnings forecasts are more likely to occur when there are large negative earnings surprises in an environment where the private litigation cost is high. In support of this hypothesis, Baginski et al. (2002) reveal that Canadian firms, which operated in a less litigious environment compared to their U.S. counterparts, released more earnings forecasts when earnings were increasing while U.S. firms were relatively more likely to issue earnings forecasts during periods when earnings were decreasing. Therefore, we seek to investigate this issue by controlling for the earnings change direction and forecast news as any asymmetric treatment of positive and negative earnings expectations would also be inconsistent with the provisions of the continuous disclosure reform. 21 When investors and analysts are surprised by the large earnings changes, firms face greater potential litigation and reputation impairment costs; therefore, the magnitude of the expected earnings change is likely to be an important factor influencing firms' disclosure decisions (Kasznik and Lev, 1995) . These costs are likely to increase after the passage of the regulatory reform. Therefore, we control for the magnitude of earnings changes. 22 Prior research finds that larger firms issue more management earnings forecasts (Cox, 1985; Waymire, 1985) . 23 For example, the Australian continuous disclosure regime has become increasingly more onerous since 1994 and the U.S. listing rules require quarterly reporting and Form 8-K filings for certain one-off events. These disclosure rules and the associated litigation risk for non-compliance might lead to fewer earnings forecasts and observed variation in the qualitative characteristics of these earnings forecasts relative to non-cross-listed firms. Alternatively, it could be argued that cross-listed firms exposed to the Australian continuous disclosure system have more, not fewer, earnings forecasts. However, after retesting all models excluding those cross-listed on the ASX, the results for XLIST remained substantially similar to the main findings. .83% for open-ended, range and point forecasts, respectively). As shown in Table 3 , Panel C, there is also a significant improvement in the accuracy of last range and point earnings forecasts with their forecast error declining from a mean of 0.219 to 0.017. 24 The average number of overall (non-routine) forecasts has increased from 1.846 to 2.241 (0.258 to 0.529) (see Table 3 ). Also, multiple forecasts increased. Firm-years pre-empted by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 earnings forecasts in the pre-(post-) reform period are 71, 58, 23, 10, 1 and 0 (60, 57, 46, 15, 7 and 2), respectively. 25 As measuring the change in forecast horizon for multiple forecasters is problematic, we only focus on the first earnings forecast in the financial year.
Results
Univariate Analysis
forecasts, 141 (19.58%) are associated with non-routine announcements which is far greater than those produced by Australian firms with an analyst following (Chan et al., 2007) . Also, the frequency of bad news earnings forecasts (16.94% before and 18.62% after the reform is much lower than those reported in other jurisdictions.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The univariate results show that the introduction of the continuous disclosure reform is associated with an increase in forecast likelihood, frequency, precision and accuracy, thus leading to preliminary rejection of H1, H2, H4 and H5. Despite a marginal decline, the forecast horizon statistically remained stable across the reform, which implies that H3 cannot be rejected.
Multivariate Analysis
The results from estimating the multiple regression models used to jointly test the hypothesised relationships are presented in Tables 4 to 10 . 27 These are supplemented with results from estimating sub-sample models based on the direction of earnings changes (negative/positive) and news content (bad/neutral/good news). 26 Chan et al. (2007) document that in Australia, 22.1 percent are bad news and Baginski et al. (2002) show that 35.1 percent and 35.7 percent are bad news in the U.S. and Canada, respectively. 27 Prior to estimating the regression models, variables with extreme values were winsorised (to a maximum of 1 percent of the sample observations). Also, bivariate correlations were conducted and none appear to be sufficiently large to suggest multicollinearity. Thus, these results indicate that in the post-reform period, firms were more likely to pre-empt their earnings announcements with an earnings forecast (either through routine or non-routine announcements) and were more likely to pre-empt through a non-routine than through a routine announcement. Therefore, H1 is rejected.
The Likelihood of Firms Issuing Management Earnings Forecasts
Further evidence from the FCAST1 model reveals significant coefficients for the firm-specific attribute control variables. Larger positive earnings changes are associated with an increased likelihood of earnings forecasts. Larger firms were more likely to pre-empt their earnings announcements with earnings forecasts which is consistent with Cox (1985) and Waymire (1985) . Cross-listed firms with positive earnings changes provided fewer earnings forecasts.
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The results for firm-specific attribute control variables in FCAST2 model are generally similar to those reported in FCAST1 model.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
28 The FCAST2 results differ from Chan et al. (2007) who document that legislative changes and increased enforcement action were followed by a significant increase in the disclosure of only bad news non-routine management earnings forecasts. 29 Further analysis shows that quarterly reporting may have contributed to the lower forecast likelihood for crosslisted firms as untabulated results reveal a significantly positive relationship between cross-listing status and the issuance of quarterly reports. Table 7 presents results obtained from estimating the forecast precision PRECISE1 model.
The Frequency of Management Earnings Forecasts Issued by Firms
The Horizon of Management Earnings Forecasts Issued by Firms
The Precision of Management Earnings Forecasts
The results reveal a significant positive REFORM coefficient (p-value = 0.000) for the full sample indicating that forecast precision has increased after the reform, thus rejecting H4.
This finding is only supported by the bad and good news earnings forecast sub-samples.
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Further evidence in Table 7 is the highly negative GOOD coefficient which suggests that good news earnings forecasts were less precise than bad or neutral news ones. Firms with larger earnings change issued their neutral earnings forecasts in a less precise form. Larger firms facing bad news expectations were more likely to release less precise forecasts and cross-listed firms with bad and good news tended to issue more precise forecasts. Firms with higher growth prospects tended to provide neutral and good news earnings forecasts in a more precise form. In addition, earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with non-routine announcements and those with shorter horizon tended to be more precise.
[INSERT 
The Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts
Sensitivity Analysis
Ten sensitivity tests are undertaken to ensure the robustness of the results to various conditions and alternate specifications of variable constructs. Details of these tests are summarised in Table 9 .
[ INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 32 We also examine forecast bias as measured by the signed forecast error and the untabulated results provide no evidence of a change in either positive or negative forecast bias in the pre-or post-reform period.
Overall, the sensitivity analysis shows that the main findings, with one exception regarding model 3 -forecast horizon, are robust to various alternative conditions and specifications. For model 3 -forecast horizon, the sensitivity tests to control for prior forecast reputation and to exclude ASX-listed firms document no change in forecast horizon after the reform which is different from the main findings.
Conclusion
The objective of our study has been to investigate the impact of the continuous disclosure reform on a range of management earnings forecast characteristics: likelihood, frequency, horizon, precision and accuracy in New Zealand where a low private litigation environment prevails. Using a sample of 720 management earnings forecasts provided by 94 NZX-listed firms during the financial reporting periods ending between 31 January 1999 and 31
December 2005, we provide strong evidence of significant changes in management forecasting behaviour in the post-reform period. Specifically, there has been an increase in the likelihood that firms issue an earnings forecast (overall and non-routine), the frequency of earnings forecasts issued by firms (overall and non-routine), and the precision and the accuracy of earnings forecasts.
Our findings lend support to prior New Zealand evidence that this enhancement of public regulation in New Zealand has had a positive impact on corporate behaviour. Given the low private litigation environment in New Zealand, it is reasonable to conclude that the changes we observe are due to the increase in public regulation inherent in the continuous disclosure reform. It is interesting that this public reform has had an impact on corporate behaviour given the lack of strong evidence on active enforcement of the reform. A possible interpretation is that public regulatory reforms are able to have a greater benefit in circumstances where private enforcement is a less viable alternative. If this is so, our findings have implications for other low private litigation jurisdictions and contribute to the debate regarding the value of further regulatory reform internationally.
A further finding of our study is that the changes in forecasting behaviour after the continuous disclosure reform in New Zealand were observed for both good and bad news disclosing firms. This lack of asymmetric treatment of good and bad news is different from prior research on continuous disclosure. For instance, while Brown et al. (1999) The major limitation of this study is the small sample within a small but largely unique jurisdiction; therefore, the generalisability of our findings is limited. In addition, given that the sample firms must survive a minimum of five years, the results might not be representative of firms which did not survive the sample period.
This study adds to the evidence that firm specific characteristics play an important role in the determination of management earnings forecasting behaviour. While we have included numerous firm characteristics as control variables, we have not considered and leave open for further research the role of corporate governance in determining regulatory compliance decisions. 17.971** ^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. N is the number of firm-years with financial reporting dates ending between 31 January 1999 and 31 December 2005 for 94 firms (655 less 23 missing firm-years). An earnings forecast is an announcement made to the NZX pre-empting a current financial year's earnings announcement. A firm-year is classified as a pre-reform (postreform) firm-year if its financial reporting date ends before (after) 1 December 2002. Earnings Change is the change in yearly earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the current financial year. 57 (43.51%) 19 (44.19%) 38 (43.18%) 0.012 FHORIZON 100 (107) 124 (124) 89 ( Hirst et al. (2008) The coefficients of all interaction variables are insignificant. The results obtained do not reveal any significant differences to the main findings previously reported. ECHANGE_VOL (change in earnings per share volatility over the prior five financial years) is included in all five models. Hirst et al. (2008) The ECHANGE_VOL coefficient is positively significant in models 1 and 2 and negatively significant in model 3. Except for the ECHANGE coefficient losing its significance, other results are not significantly different from the main findings. CAPITAL_RAISING (a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm raises capital during the financial year and 0 otherwise) is included in models 1, 2 and 4. Frankel et al. (1995) The CAPITAL_RAISING coefficient is insignificant. Other results are not significant different from the main findings. Dichotomous variables for six major industry categories: (1) materials, mining or energy, (2) technology, telecommunication or biotechnology, (3) financial services, (4) utilities, airports, airlines, ports or shipping, (5) manufacturing or healthcare and (6) consumer staples, are included in all five models. Hirst et al. (2008) Firms in the financial services industry tended to release fewer earnings forecasts. Firms in manufacturing and healthcare industry tended to issue more earnings forecasts. None of other industry dichotomous variables are associated with the forecast decision. None of the industry dichotomous variables are significant in models 3 to 5. ACCURACY (a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast is ex post shown to be accurate and 0 otherwise). A 10 percent materiality level is applied for range and point earnings forecasts.
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The results do not reveal any significant improvement in the forecast accuracy in the post-reform period. The imposition of a subjective materiality threshold for quantitative earnings forecasts might have contributed to these contradictory findings. CREDIBILITY (a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if firms pre-empt prior earnings announcements with accurate earnings forecasts and 0 otherwise) is included in all five models. Similar to ACCURACY, a 10 percent materiality level is applied for range and point earnings forecasts. Rogers and Stocken (2005) The forecast likelihood and frequency increased for firms with prior accurate earnings forecasts. Prior forecasting history had no impact on the qualitative characteristics of earnings forecasts made. Except for the REFORM coefficient in model 3 being no longer negative and significant, other results are consistent with the main findings. All five models are retested after dropping firm-years that fall within six months of the effective date of the reform (i.e. approximately 12 months around 1 December 2002). Some firms might have either responded earlier or postponed their responses depending on the closeness of this date to their financial reporting dates; therefore our results might have been influenced by such behaviour. Frijns et al. (2008) The results are quantitatively similar to the main findings.
Models 3 to 5 are retested after dropping neutral news earnings forecasts. The BAD and GOOD variables are removed and ENEWS (a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for good news earnings forecasts and 0 otherwise) is included in these three models. Hirst et al. (2008) The results are quantitatively similar to the main findings.
All five models are retested after dropping ASX-listed firms. ASX-listed firms also faced increasing legal threat during the period 2001-2004 due to the corporate disasters of the early 2000s leading up to the CLERP9 reform in mid-2004; therefore, these confounding events might have confused our results.
Golding and Kalfus (2004) Huang et al. (2009) Except for model 3 where the REFORM coefficient is no longer significant, similar results are obtained for all models. It is possible that the decline in forecast horizon in the post-reform period might be attributed to ASX-listed firms.
ANALYST (the number of analysts following the firm during the financial year) is included in all five models. Hirst et al. (2008) The ANALYST coefficient is insignificant in all five models. The results for the other variables remain unchanged.
